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1 Introduction
Does immigration lead to higher unemployment rates in the destination country?
As immigration and trade exposure of a country are highly correlated, it is the
aim of this paper to study the effect of immigration on unemployment in OECD
countries explicitly taking into account trade volumes of receiving countries.
This question is of eminent political importance as its answer, or at least
what policy makers perceive as its correct answer, has direct consequences for
millions of potential migrants across the globe. For example, as a reaction to
rising unemployment rates in the wake of the financial crisis, several countries
implemented voluntary return programs (VRPs) for migrants with entitlements
to domestic unemployment benefit schemes. These programs offered financial
incentives like a free one way return ticket as well as lump sum payments if
immigrants left the host country and did not return for at least three years. Even
though few of the migrants eligible for the programs did actually participate,
according to Manzano and Vaccaro (2009), the Spanish government spent e 21
million in 2009 on this kind of program.1
At the European level, in the vein of the last two enlargements of the European
Union, both treaties of accession2 contained clauses about a transition period
before workers from the new member states could be employed on equal, non-
discriminatory terms in the old member states as policy makers feared negative
effects on labor markets in the EU-15 countries. The old member states had the
possibility to impose restrictions for worker immigration for a transitional period
of two years. Afterwards, they could decide to extend it for another three years.
After five years, if the country informed the European Commission of serious
disruptions on its labor market the period could be extended for the last time for
1 Besides Spain also the Czech Republic and Japan have introduced VRPs. For further details see
Fix et al. (2009).
2 The “Treaty of Accession 2003” was the agreement between the European Union and ten countries
(Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia, Slovak
Republic) concerning these countries’ accession into the EU that took place 2004. The “Treaty of
Accession 2005” is an agreement between the European Union and Bulgaria and Romania concerning
accession into the EU of the latter two countries that took place 2007.
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two more years.3 Austria and Germany were the only member states which used up
the whole seven year period for shutting off their labor markets from inflows from
eight of the ten accession countries from 2004 (from all but Malta and Cyprus).
This seven year period ended on May 1st, 2011.
How did Austria and Germany actually argue for the serious disruption on
their labor markets? Basically, two arguments where brought forward defending
transitional immigration restrictions. First, Germany’s State Secretary for Em-
ployment Gerd Andres defended Germany’s decision to maintain restrictions by
pointing out that the disruptions brought about by adjustment effects would be too
high without the transitional restrictions. Second, he argued that “the geographical
position is very different for Germany and Austria than it is for France or the
UK”.4 EU-Employment Commissioner Vladimir Špidla accepted the application
for prolongation of the restrictions from both Austria and Germany by arguing
that both countries “are undergoing serious disturbance of their labour markets
as a consequence of the general economic downturn.”5 In essence, the reports
to the European Commission only argued for the supposedly existing disruptive
consequences of what was perceived as a premature opening of labor markets.
However, to the best of our knowledge, no evidence was provided which would
back up the causal link between higher immigration and unemployment or any
other detrimental labor market effects. The causality, it seems, was taken for
granted.6
This example illustrates the widely held belief that on average, immigration
has detrimental effects on the labor market in the destination country.7 This
is in contrast with much of the current empirical evaluations of the effects of
3 For more details, see European Commission: Employment, Social Affairs and
Inclusion. Enlargement–transitional provisions. Retrieved on 09/02/2012 from
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=466&langId=en.
4 EurActiv.com (2009). Free movement of labour in the EU 27. EurActiv.com. Retrieved on
09/02/2012 from http://www.euractiv.com/socialeurope/free-movement-labour-eu-27/article-129648.
5 Slegers, M. (2009). Spidla “accepts” German and Austrian labour market move. Europolitics.
Retrieved on 07/02/2012 from http://www.europolitics.info/spidla-accepts-german-and-austrian-
labour-market-move-artr239442-25.html.
6 See European Commission (2006).
7 Using European Social Survey data, Dustmann and Preston (2004) show that EU citizens believe
that average wages are brought down by immigrants. In addition, even though Europeans do not
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migration on wages of domestic workers in the destination country. These studies
can be grouped into three types. The first uses the elementary model of labor
demand and carries out simulations in order to quantify the effects (see for example
Borjas (1999)). The second approach uses natural experiments, i.e. supposedly
exogenous inflows of migrants, like a short episode of easier Cuban immigration to
Miami (Mariel boat lift study by Card (1990)) or the immigration to France in the
wake of the Algerian independence (Hunt (1992)).8 The third approach estimates
parameters of a regression of (changes) in wages or employment on the number of
migrants and a set of control variables to identify the causal effect of immigration
(Borjas, Freeman, and Katz (1997), Borjas (1999), and Friedberg and Hunt (1995)).
All three approaches usually find very modest effects of immigration on workers
in the destination country.9 Not surprisingly, the Czech government opposed the
prolongation of immigration restrictions in Germany and Austria as these were
against “available evidence”.10
All these empirical studies of the effects of immigration were done by labor
economists. To the contrary, analysis of the process of European integration,
or more broadly globalization in general, typically falls in the domain of trade
economists. While trade economists paid only scant attention to labor market
frictions for a long time, the effects of globalization on unemployment featured
more prominently in recent trade models. This recent literature focuses on models
with heterogeneous firms and increasing returns to scale (see Egger and Kre-
ickemeier (2009, 2011), Felbermayr, Prat, and Schmerer (2011a), Helpman and
Itskhoki (2010), Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding (2009, 2010a, 2010b)). One of
think that immigrants take away jobs from domestic workers, they do not think that immigration can
relieve labor shortages.
8 Recent studies have also used the mass inflow of German expellees into West Germany after World
War II and of ethnic Germans from former socialist countries after the fall of the Iron Curtain as
quasi-natural experiments to identify the causal labor market effects of immigration (see Braun and
Mahmoud (2011) and Glitz (2012)). Also internal migration caused by the Great Depression in the
US during the 1930s has been identified as a quasi-natural experiment to study the labor market
consequences of immigration, see Boustan, Fishback, and Kantor (2010).
9 For a very recent survey on the economic impacts of immigration, see Kerr and Kerr (2011).
10 EurActiv.com (2009). Free movement of labour in the EU 27. EurActiv.com. Retrieved on
02/09/2012 from http://www.euractiv.com/socialeurope/free-movement-labour-eu-27/article-129648.
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the main findings in this literature is that trade liberalization is likely to reduce
unemployment rates.
This literature also spurred new empirical investigations into the trade and
unemployment nexus. Dutt, Mitra, and Ranjan (2009) as well as Felbermayr, Prat,
and Schmerer (2011b) investigate empirically the trade and unemployment nexus
using high-quality OECD cross-section and panel data. They both find support for
a negative relationship between openness and unemployment levels.
While both papers use a battery of labor-market related control variables in
their regressions, none considers the effects of (im)migration. This is astonishing as
it is well known since Mundell (1957) that “[c]ommodity movements are at least to
some extent a substitute for factor movement”. In a standard two goods, two factors
trade model without trade costs, factor prices will equalize through goods trade.
Hence, goods trade has the same effect as if factors could wander freely between
countries. In other words, immigration has the same impact on factor prices as
trade. When factor prices cannot fully adjust, there will be additional effects on the
quantity of labor used, i.e. the unemployment rate. Hence, (factor) price differences
between countries will trigger both, trade and immigration flows, implying that
trade and immigration are not statistically independent and therefore correlated.
While standard neoclassical trade theory predicts that price differentials can be
mitigated by either migration or trade which leads to a negative correlation between
trade and migration, recent evidence has suggested that immigration may actually
spur trade (e.g. Gould (1994), Felbermayr, Jung, and Toubal (2009)). Theoretical
predictions concerning the effects of immigration on unemployment are ambiguous
and depend inter alia on factor endowments, production and market structure and
differences in institutions. In the labor demand model with one sector and rigid
wages, immigration leads to an increase of unemployment (see Boeri and van Ours
(2008), pp. 178). In general equilibrium trade models with capital and labor as
production factors, constant returns to scale and perfect competition, immigration
has an ambiguous effect on aggregate unemployment (see for example Brecher and
Chen (2010)). To the contrary, with increasing returns to scale and monopolistic
competition, immigration leads to a fall of unemployment (see Epifani and Gancia
(2005) and Südekum (2005)). There are many good surveys about international
migration and trade. Gaston and Nelson (2011) is a particular useful one in the
context of this paper as it surveys current theoretical and empirical research on
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international migration with a particular emphasis on the links between trade theory
and labor empirics.
In the light of this discussion the question arises why goods trade should have
a statistically significant effect on unemployment whilst (im)migration has not.
And when trade decreases unemployment, should not (im)migration, too? If the
answer to these questions is in the affirmative, one has to conclude that previous
studies may suffer from a potential omitted variable bias. The direction of this bias
is not clear a priori, as it depends on whether trade and migration are substitutes or
complements.11
We want to contribute to both the trade and immigration literature and address
this omitted variable bias by considering not only the effects of goods trade flows
on unemployment, but also of migration flows. In order to do so, we have to deal
with the problem that migrants do not select their destination countries randomly.
Rather, it is likely that they migrate into countries with better economic conditions,
including countries with lower unemployment rates. This creates an endogeneity
problem. We deal with it by using dynamic panel regressions as well as a Frankel
and Romer (1999) type instrument. It uses the fact that immigration flows are to a
large part determined by geographic variables like the distance between sending and
receiving country, i.e. factors which are arguably exogenous to the determination
of the unemployment rate.12
Finally, note that we do not distinguish between the impact of immigrants of
different skill groups on unemployment as panel data for different immigrant skill
classes for a large set of countries and a sufficient time span are not available.
We therefore focus on aggregate migration flows to address the concern of policy
makers and the public at large which presupposes a positive impact of immigration
on the level of the unemployment rate on average. Accordingly, the transition
periods of the EU accession treaties also presuppose on average a positive impact
11 Relatedly, Ortega and Peri (2011) also argue that previous studies of the effects of both trade and
migration suffer from an omitted variable bias as both trade and migration are highly correlated.
They use data on OECD countries from 1980 to 2007 to study the effects of trade and immigration
on GDP per capita. However, they do not study effects on unemployment rates.
12 Ottaviano, Peri, and Wright (2010) study the impact of both migration and offshoring in the US on
employment of US workers using a theoretical trade framework as basis for their empirical analysis
across manufacturing industries. However, they do not study overall unemployment.
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and do not distinguish between workers of different skill levels. By this we offer
an alternative empirical strategy which complements the more micro-level based
empirical studies typically undertaken by labor economists.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes
the database and gives suggestive evidence. Section 3 describes the empirical
specification. Section 4 provides the empirical results. The last section concludes.
2 Data and Descriptive Evidence
To examine the relationship between migration, trade and unemployment we
collected a panel dataset from 1997 to 2007 for 24 OECD countries.13 The
selection of countries as well as the time period is driven by concerns of data
availability. In addition, we try to follow Felbermayr, Prat, and Schmerer (2011b)
and use the same control variables in order to replicate their results on the trade
and openness link for our dataset. The dataset has the advantage that it allows to
control for time-invariant country-specific effects and the dynamics (persistence)
of unemployment rates. The variables used are summarized in Table 1 and 2. We
describe each variable in turn in the following.
2.1 Unemployment Rates, Immigration and Trade Openness
The dependent variable is the yearly average harmonized unemployment rate (as
percentage of the civilian labor force) from the OECD (2011d) Key Short-Term
Economic Indicators, the same data as used in Felbermayr, Prat, and Schmerer
(2011b). These data have the advantage that they are available for the whole time
period under consideration and for all OECD member countries. In addition, the
OECD has ensured that unemployment rates are comparable across countries.
The migration data are from the OECD (2011b) International Migration
Database. It contains bilateral data both on flows and stocks of immigrants. Note
that the data do not contain information on illegal migration. Even though data
13 The countries included are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States.
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Table 1: Summary statistics for migration, trade and unemployment dataset
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Total unemployment rate 6.735 2.896 2.245 19.025 207
Migration data
Net immigrant inflows (ln) 10.834 1.381 7.651 14.041 207
Total immigrant inflows (ln) 11.308 1.292 8.598 14.041 207
Stock of immigrants (foreign nationals) (ln) 13.386 1.319 9.222 15.711 150
Stock of immigrants (foreign born) (ln) 14.041 1.541 11.365 17.441 111
Net inflows (ln) (prediction) 11.566 1.269 8.949 14.044 207
Openness measures
Total trade openness 78.883 41.244 22.884 217.786 207
Total current price openness 80.491 38.867 18.188 184.308 207
Merchandise curr. price open. 31.218 17.046 8.236 91.566 207
Merchandise openness 30.325 16.847 8.535 106.512 207
Labor market data
Wage distortion (index) 57.170 18.418 25.187 92.17 207
EPL (index) 2.008 0.818 0.170 4.330 207
Union density (index) 32.755 20.362 7.617 81.285 207
High corporatism (index) 2.546 1.364 0 6 207
PMR (index) 2.348 0.728 0.900 4.700 207
Other control variables
Population (ln) 16.749 1.228 15.127 19.525 207
Output gap (%) 0.487 1.562 -2.901 4.752 207
Civil liberties (index) 1.159 0.367 1 2 207
Years since perm. trade lib./1945 42.304 12.423 12 62 207
Table 2: Summary statistics for gravity dataset
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Bilateral immigrant inflows 1,286 6,316 0 218,822 41,545
Bilateral geographical distance (ln) 8.570 0.885 5.081 9.880 41,545
Contiguity 0.025 0.157 0 1 41,545
Common official language 0.120 0.325 0 1 41,545
Colonial relationship after 1945 0.019 0.138 0 1 41,545
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for some countries are available before 1997, broad coverage only starts then and
we therefore opt to start our analysis with this year. Specifically, it contains data
on the inflows and outflows of immigrants from country i to j defining a migrant
as someone with a different nationality than the receiving country. From these
data we construct total inflows of immigrants by collapsing the bilateral data. Also
note that outflows do only include foreigners, i.e. return migrants. It does not
include nationals leaving their home country. Hence net inflows are inflows of
foreign nationals. Note that our regressions only include the receiving countries
of immigrants. However, to construct the inflow data we use information about
the immigrants from all 198 sending countries of immigrants.14 The huge discrep-
ancy between the high number of sending countries but low number of receiving
countries stems from the fact that few countries provide accurate data on immi-
gration. However, those countries that do report these data also have data on the
nationalities of all the persons immigrating into the country. Therefore, our data
set includes immigrants from all major immigrant sending countries like China,
India, North-African and Latin American countries.15 In addition, the data contain
information on the total stock of immigrants, using either an immigrant definition
based on the nationality of the person or its country of birth. Note that stock data
are only available for a different set of countries as national governments differ in
their used definitions of migrants and hence do not necessarily collect data using
both definitions.16
14 The complete list of sending countries can be found in Table 3.
15 Countries with flow data used in the regressions are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom,
and United States. Outflows are not available (for a subset of years) for Canada, France, Ireland,
Italy, Korea, Poland, Slovak Republic, Spain, and Turkey. For these cases, we treat total inflows as
net inflows, in effect overstating the number of migrants entering the country. Our main results are
robust to this treatment.
16 Stock data based on nationality are available (for at least a subset of years) for Austria, Belgium,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United
Kingdom; stock data based on country of birth are available (for at least a subset of years) for
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Hungary, Ireland, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United
States.
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Table 3: List of sending countries of immigrants to construct the inflow data
List of sending countries
Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia,
Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium,
Belize, Benin, Bermuda, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei
Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Cen-
tral African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Chinese Taipei, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Cook
Islands, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Domini-
can Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji,
Finland, Former Yug. Rep. of Macedonia, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana,
Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hong Kong
(China), Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jor-
dan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Korea, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho,
Liberia, Libya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macao, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives,
Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia, Moldova, Mongo-
lia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Niue, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Palestinian administrative
areas, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Puerto Rico,
Qatar, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent
and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia
and Montenegro, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Solomon
Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzer-
land, Syria, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tokelau, Tonga, Trinidad and
Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United
Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia,
Zimbabwe.
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log of net immigrant inflows over population
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Figure 1: Average unemployment and log of net immigrant inflows over population of the receiving
country
Figure 1 provides a first look on the unemployment migration nexus. It plots
the average unemployment rate over the period of 1997 to 2007 against the aver-
age logged immigration net inflows over the population of the receiving country
for the period of 1997 to 2007. As we see, this figure suggests a negative rela-
tionship between immigration and unemployment. Figures 2 and 3 plot average
unemployment rates against the average of the logged stock of foreign nationals
over the population of the receiving country and the logged stock of foreign born
immigrants over population, respectively. Again, we find a negative relationship
between immigration and unemployment.
This correlation between unemployment and migration may be misleading
due to two main effects: i) It is an unconditional correlation, ignoring potential
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log of stock of immigrants (foreign nationals) over population
OECD countries, average 1997−2007
Figure 2: Average unemployment and log of stock of immigrants (foreign nationals) over population
of the receiving country
heterogeneity of countries and other driving factors, and ii) the endogeneity of
migration flows and unemployment.
Concerning migration from the perspective of an individual, two questions
arise: The first question is whether to migrate at all, and the second question, given
that one decided to migrate, where to migrate. The labor literature typically models
those two decisions sequentially, where the second step depends on expected wage
differences between the origin and destination country, accounting for unemploy-
ment differences (see Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004) and Boeri and van Ours (2008)
for an overview). In other words, immigration will be larger all else equal into
countries with lower unemployment rates. This is consistent with Figures 1, 2, and
3.
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log of stock of immigrants (foreign born) over population
OECD countries, average 1997−2007
Figure 3: Average unemployment and log of stock of immigrants (foreign born) over population of
the receiving country
However, we are interested in the causal effect of immigration on unemploy-
ment. Hence, we have to control for the reversed causality. In order to get rid of
the endogeneity problem due to reversed causality, we are pursuing two strategies.
First, we control for time-invariant and country-specific effects. This wipes out all
level effects between countries. Hence, these regressions only use the change in
unemployment levels and immigration inflows to identify the coefficients.
Figure 4 plots the change of unemployment against the change of immigra-
tion inflows over the population of the receiving country. This transformation
removes the unobserved time-invariant country-specific heterogeneity. Again, the
figure suggests a negative relationship between immigration and unemployment.
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Figure 4: Change in unemployment and change in log of net immigrant inflows over population of
the receiving country
Our second approach to control for the endogeneity due to reversed causality is
to instrument the migration flows. Besides using external instruments, we will
follow the established methodology used in Dutt, Mitra, and Ranjan (2009) and
Felbermayr, Prat, and Schmerer (2011b) and rely on dynamic panel estimators
which use internal instruments, i.e. suitable lags of regressors in both differences
and levels, in order to control for both unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity
as well as endogeneity of the migration variable. In addition, these estimators
allow to control for the possible endogeneity of other control variables like e.g. the
openness measure capturing trade linkages of the migration receiving country.
Let us next describe our second main explanatory variable, trade openness. We
follow Alcalá and Ciccone (2004) and Felbermayr, Prat, and Schmerer (2011b)
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and construct a real openness measure, labeled total trade openness. It is defined as
the sum of total imports and exports in exchange rate US-$ over GDP in purchasing
power parity US-$. We construct it by multiplying the current price openness
measure (total current price openness) times the GDP price level from the Penn
World Tables, edition 7.0 from Heston, Summers, and Aten (2011).17
In addition, we construct openness measures for merchandise trade only using
data from the OECD (2011c) International Trade by Commodity Statistics database.
Again, we calculate a real and current price openness measure (merchandise
openness and merchandise current price openness, respectively). We will describe
the used control variables in the following section.
2.2 Controls
We closely follow Felbermayr, Prat, and Schmerer (2011b) in our choice of control
variables.
Wage distortion is the sum of the tax wedge and the average replacement rate.
The tax wedge is the average tax wedge on labor as a percentage of total labor
compensation and is computed for a couple with two children and averages across
different situations regarding the wage of the second earner. Tax wedge data are
from the OECD. Specifically, we use the tax wedge data from Bassanini and Duval
(2009) until 2003 and the publicly available data for 2004 to 2007 from the OECD
(2011f) Taxing Wages database. Note that for the overlapping years, data from
both sources do not perfectly match for some countries. In general, however, data
are nearly or even exactly the same. We therefore merge the data to fill up the
variable for the whole sample period. The average replacement rates are from the
Benefits and Wages study from the OECD (2007). They are defined as the average
of the gross unemployment benefit replacement rates for two earnings levels, three
family situations and three durations of unemployment and is comparable across
countries. As data are available only for odd years, we follow Bassanini and Duval
(2009) and interpolate the data for even years. For a detailed description of the
OECD replacement rate measures, see Martin (1996).
17 Felbermayr, Prat, and Schmerer (2011b) use the Penn World Tables, edition 6.2.
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EPL is an employment protection legislation index which is comparable across
countries and is from the Going for Growth database from the OECD (2010). It
measures protection for regular employment and ranges from 0 to 6 from weakest
to strongest protection.
Union density corresponds to the ratio of wage and salary earners that are trade
union members to the total number of wage and salary earners and is from the
OECD (2011e) Labour Force Statistics.
High corporatism is an index variable from the Database on Institutional
Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social
Pacts which is compiled at the Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies
(AIAS) at the University of Amsterdam by Visser (2011). It measures the degree
of coordination of wage bargaining in the respective country where 1 indicates
firm-level wage bargaining and 5 equals economy-wide bargaining.18
PMR is a measure of product market regulation on a scale from 0 to 6 indicating
increasing regulatory restrictions to competition from Conway et al. (2006). We
again follow Felbermayr, Prat, and Schmerer (2011b) and use the OECD data on
regulation in seven sectors—telecoms, electricity, gas, post, rail, air passenger
transport, and road freight—to measure overall product market regulation. As
manufacturing sectors are less regulated and open to foreign competition, and most
anti-competitive legislation is concentrated in the considered sectors, the measures
do reflect an important part of the overall degree of product market regulation in a
country, see Conway et al. (2006). The measures are based on regulation-related
policies in the respective countries and are specifically constructed to allow cross-
country comparisons. Further details on these measures can be found in Conway
and Nicoletti (2006).19
Population is the population of the receiving country from the OECD (2011e)
Labour Force Statistics.
18 Note that Felbermayr, Prat, and Schmerer (2011b) only use a dummy variable from Bassanini
and Duval (2009) to indicate high wage coordination. These data, however, are only available until
2003 and do not vary across our sample period and hence would be dropped from the regression. We
therefore use the index measure which contains more information.
19 Note that the OECD also compiles data on economy-wide measures of product market regulation.
These, however, are only collected irregularly, prohibiting their use in a panel study. The used
measure is highly correlated with the economy-wide measure for the years where it is available.
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Output gap is the output gap in percent as reported in the OECD (2011a)
Economic Outlook No. 89 data.
In additional regressions, we include control variables from Dutt, Mitra, and
Ranjan (2009). Civil liberties is an index computed by Freedom House (2011)
which gives the amount of civil liberties in a country. It runs from 1 to 7 where 1
indicates a maximum of liberties. Dutt, Mitra, and Ranjan (2009) include a dummy
which is 1 in the years after a country has permanently liberalized trade. In our
sample, all countries have free trade according to this index, hence we cannot
include this dummy as it does not have variation. Therefore, we construct the
variable years since liberalization which measures the years since a country has
permanently liberalized its trade. It is based on data collected by Wacziarg and
Welch (2008).20
To generate the instrumental variable, the predicted bilateral migration flows
from a gravity-type migration regression, we use indicators for contiguity, com-
mon official language, and common colonial relationship after 1945 as well as
the weighted bilateral distance between economic centers of the receiving and
sending countries. All variables are from CEPII, see Head, Mayer, and Ries (2010).
Summary statistics for the gravity dataset can be found in Table 2.
3 Empirical Specification
We follow Nickell, Nunziata, and Ochel (2005) and Felbermayr, Prat, and Schmerer
(2011b) and estimate variants of the following dynamic model:
uit = ρui,t−1 +αNET INFLOWit + γOPENNESSit
+δCONTROLSit +νi +νt + εit , (1)
where uit is the unemployment rate in country i at time t, NET INFLOWit is the net
inflow of immigrants into country i at time t, OPENNESSit is a standard openness
measure (the sum of imports and exports over GDP), CONTROLSit is a vector of
20 We assume the year 1945 for all countries where Wacziarg and Welch (2008) report “always”
instead of a specific year as the permanent liberalization year. In our sample, these countries are
Norway, Portugal, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States.
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control variables, and νi, νt , εit are country and period effects and an error term,
respectively. In contrast to Felbermayr, Prat, and Schmerer (2011b) we do not use
five-year averages for our regressions as we would lose a lot of observations given
the short time-series of the migration data. Additionally, we also want to capture
the short-term transitional effects of migration on unemployment in our dynamic
specifications which precludes us from taking averages over years.
The standard estimator for dynamic panel models with unobserved time-
invariant heterogeneity is the difference GMM estimator as proposed by Arellano
and Bond (1991). However, this estimator suffers from potentially huge small
sample bias when the number of time periods is small and the dependent variable
shows a high degree of persistence, see Alonso-Borrego and Arellano (1999). As
unemployment numbers are very persistent, we follow Arellano and Bover (1995)
and Blundell and Bond (1998) and also present estimates of the model using system
GMM which circumvents the finite sample bias if one is willing to assume a mild
stationarity assumption on the initial conditions of the underlying data generating
process.21 This estimator uses moment conditions for the model both in differences
and in levels to reap significant efficiency gains. However, efficiency gains do not
come without a cost: The number of instruments tends to increase exponentially
with the number of time periods. This proliferation of instruments leads to an
overfitting of endogenous variables and increases the likelihood of false positive
results and suspiciously high pass rates of specification tests like Hansen’s J-test, a
routinely used statistic to check the validity of the dynamic panel model, see Rood-
man (2009a). We therefore follow his advice and present results with a collapsed
instrument matrix for both the difference and system GMM estimators.22 We also
use the Windmeijer (2005) finite sample correction for standard errors.
As described above, NET INFLOW it is likely to be endogenous. Hence, we
instrument this variable by suitable lags. In addition, we use an external instrument.
To find an external valid instrument, we have to look for other determinants of
migration besides destination country unemployment. A natural candidate are
predicted migrant inflows, a method inspired by Frankel and Romer (1999) who
21 Specifically, the deviations from the long-run mean of the dependent variable have to be uncorre-
lated with the stationary individual-specific long-run mean itself, see Blundell and Bond (1998).
22 All GMM estimations are carried out using the xtabond2 package in Stata, see Roodman (2009b).
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use predicted trade flows as an instrument for trade flows.23 The predictions of
migrant flows are obtained by estimating a gravity equation. The gravity equation
has a long history in the literatures on bilateral aggregate trade and migration
flows. In fact, the earliest uses of the gravity equation were to model migration
flows, cf. Ravenstein (1885, 1889). Since then, the gravity equation has been
used extensively to model migration flows, cf. Zipf (1946), Stewart (1948), Isard
(1975), Sen and Smith (1995). The gravity model was first adopted for studying
international trade flows in Tinbergen (1962) and Linnemann (1966), and is well
established in the trade literature.
More precisely, bilateral international migration INFLOWi jt is specified as
a function of geographic variables, GDPs and so called “multilateral resistance”
terms (see Anderson and van Wincoop (2003)):






where Yit and Yjt are the GDPs of the origin and destination, Ywt is world income,
DISTi j is a (potentially multidimensional) time-invariant distance measure between
country i and j, and Pit and Pjt are the measures for origin and destination market
potential, or “multilateral resistance” terms.
Typically, Yit/Pit and Yjt/Pjt are replaced by origin×year and destination×year
fixed effects (which also take account of Ywt) and one takes logs of Equation (2)
in order to get an empirical specification linear in the parameters, allowing to
estimate the parameters via ordinary least squares. However, as migration data are
likely to be heteroskedastic and contain zero migration flows, taking logs is no
longer feasible.24 Fortunately, there are a couple of recent contributions concerning
gravity equation estimation taking into account heteroskedasticity and zero trade
flows. Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008) propose a sample selection model
to account for zero trade flows and show that omitting zero trade flows leads to
biased estimates.
23 See Felbermayr, Hiller and Sala (2010) who also use a Frankel and Romer (1999) instrument for
immigration to investigate the effect of immigration on per capita income.
24 Some authors replace zero values by a unit value for the migration flow. In general, this leads to
inconsistent estimates.
www.economics-ejournal.org 19
conomics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal
Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006, 2008) suggest to estimate the gravity model
in multiplicative form employing a Poisson pseudo maximum likelihood esti-
mator in order to account for the “log of gravity”. The “log of gravity” says
that taking logs of the right and left hand side of the gravity equation may
lead to inconsistent and biased estimates because of Jensen’s inequality, i.e.,
E(ln INFLOWi jt) 6= lnE(INFLOWi jt). This is for example the case in the presence
of heteroskedasticity, which is very likely the case with migration and trade data.
In order to account for the heterogeneity and zeros in the bilateral migration
flow data, we follow the approach of Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006, 2008). Our
empirical specification for the first step gravity model of international bilateral
migration flows is therefore:
INFLOW i jt = exp(DIST i j +νit +ν jt)εi jt , (3)
where νit and ν jt are origin×year and destination×year fixed effects, and εi jt is
a multiplicative remainder error term. Note that the fixed effects also control for
origin and destination variables commonly used in Frankel and Romer (1999)
type regressions like the land area covered by the respective country as well as its
population.25
We specify DISTi j to consist of bilateral geographical distance (GDIST i j)26, a
contiguity dummy between countries (CONT IGi j), a dummy for a common official
primary language (COMLANG_OFFi j), and a dummy indicating whether the two
countries had a colonial relationship after 1945 (COL45i j), i.e.
DIST i j = ρ1 ln(GDISTi j)+ρ2CONT IGi j +ρ3COMLANG_OFFi j
+ρ4COL45i j. (4)
As our migration data are bilateral but our second stage regression for explain-
ing the unemployment rate has only country-time but no bilateral variation, we sum
up our predictions of migration flows ̂INFLOW i jt over all origin countries, i.e.,
25 The gravity equation explains bilateral total flows of migrants. Hence, we use bilateral total
inflows as dependent variable in specification (3).
26 We use the simple weighted bilateral distance measure as proposed by Head and Mayer (2000)
which is provided by CEPII and which is defined as distance between the regions in the respective
countries weighted by the economic size of the regions.
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̂INFLOW jt = ∑Ni=1 ̂INFLOW i jt where N is 198, the number of sending countries
of immigrants.27
4 Regression Results
In this section, we present our results. In the first subsection we present regression
results from our benchmark specification using different estimators. The second
subsection discusses several robustness checks concerning different measures of
migration, trade openness as well as using additional control variables and sample
definitions.
27 Note that we even do not need to estimate the parameters of the migration equation consistently
to use ̂INFLOW jt as a valid instrument. The only assumption we need is that ̂INFLOW jt is a
constructed exogenous measure of migration stocks or flows. For a similar argument, see Felbermayr,
Prat, and Schmerer (2011b).
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4.1 Benchmark Results
Table 4 presents eight different specifications which all use as dependent variable
the unemployment rate and some or all of the following explanatory variables: the
net inflows of migrants into the country (in logs), a measure of total trade openness,
an index of wage distortion, a measure of employment protection legislation, a
measure of union density, an index of the centralization of the wage bargaining
process, a measure of product market regulation, a country’s size as measured by
its population (in log), as well as a measure of the output gap to control for business
cycle effects. For the dynamic panel estimators, this list of regressors is augmented
by the lagged dependent variable.
Column (1) reproduces column (1) in Table 1 of Felbermayr, Prat, and Schmerer
(2011b) for our sample using a fixed effects estimator (FE). Qualitatively, results
are exactly the same as in Felbermayr, Prat, and Schmerer (2011b). However, in
our case only population and the output gap are significant.
Column (2) adds real total openness as defined in Alcalá and Ciccone (2004).
Contrary to Dutt, Mitra, and Ranjan (2009) and Felbermayr, Prat, and Schmerer
(2011b), we find a significant positive effect of international trade on unemploy-
ment. However, this does not imply that our results are necessarily at odds with
empirical findings in the literature. Both Dutt, Mitra, and Ranjan (2009) and Felber-
mayr, Prat, and Schmerer (2011b) use data for a different time period (1985–2004
and 1980–2003, respectively) and also for a larger set of countries with vastly
differing levels of development. In addition we do not use five-year averages of the
data. Our sample only focuses on a subset of OECD countries for a recent 10-year
period due to data availability of the migration data. Differences in the results may
therefore simply be due to the specifics of the sample under study. Also remember
that we treat all variables as exogenous in specifications (1) and (2), so our results
could simply be a result of the endogeneity of our regressors.
In column (3), we add the net inflow of migrants to the specification given in
column (2), again using fixed effects. It turns out that the sign of the coefficient of
the immigration flow is negative but statistically insignificant. The sign is in line
with predictions from new trade theory models with international migration but
seems to be in contradiction with predictions based on the labor demand model with
wage rigidities. Hence, immigration seems at least not to increase unemployment
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in the destination country. However, our specification given in column (3) may
suffer from an endogeneity bias. As stated in the introduction, migrants might
select into countries with lower unemployment rates.
Hence, in column (4) we take as instrument the predicted migration flows based
on the Frankel and Romer (1999) instrument described in Section 3. We use an
instrumental variables panel estimator with fixed effects (FE-IV). Instrumenting
migration flows preserves the negative sign but still does not lead to a precise
estimate. The coefficient implies that a 1 percent increase in migration inflows
leads to a decrease in the unemployment rate of 0.006 percentage points. Openness
still has a significant positive effect on unemployment.
Specification (4) still ignores both the persistence of unemployment rates as
well as the potential endogeneity of other control variables like trade openness and
wage distortion. In addition, the exogeneity of the instrument could be debated
as it is inter alia a proxy for the remoteness of a country. It is well known that
general remoteness to foreign markets is a determinant of many aggregate variables
and therefore could influence unemployment directly. We therefore investigate
the effect of migration on unemployment presenting difference and system GMM
estimates in columns (5) to (8).
Column (5) presents the specification in column (2) augmented by the lagged
dependent variable where we treat openness, wage distortion, EPL, as well as the
high corporatism measure as endogenous variables using the Arrellano and Bond
(1991) difference GMM estimator (Diff-GMM). In this specification we do not find
a significant effect of the lagged unemployment rate. Additionally, the estimated
coefficient on the lag implies a non-stationary behavior and openness is again not
significant.
Column (6) adds migration inflows to specification (5) which we also treat as
endogenous. It turns out to be non-significant again but still negative. However, one
concern in this specification is the high coefficient of the lagged dependent variable.
As soon as the dependent variable is highly persistent (our estimates would even
imply an explosive behavior of the unemployment rate), the difference GMM
estimator has poor small sample properties, see Alonso-Borrego and Arellano
(1999). This is reflected in the high standard errors of the estimates.
A suggestion for highly persistent dependent variables is the system GMM
estimator due to Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) which
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exploits more information conveyed by additional moment conditions. Column
(7) repeats specification (5) estimated with system GMM (Sys-GMM). Here, the
output gap is significantly negative. In addition, the lagged dependent variable
becomes highly significant. It also implies a very high degree of persistence in
unemployment rates as expected.
In column (8) we add migration flows to specification (7). Now, migration
flows are again negative and also significant on the 5% level. Openness still has
a positive impact on unemployment rates but not significantly so. Additionally,
the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable has the same magnitude as in
previous studies. This is our preferred specification as it allows for the endogeneity
of various regressors and can handle the persistence of our dependent variable. It
implies that a one percent increase in migration inflows leads to a 0.009 percentage
point decrease in the unemployment rate in the short-run. In the long-run, a one
percent increase of the total inflow of migrants would amount to a 0.18 percentage
point decrease in the unemployment rate.28
Note that we report p-values of Hansen’s overidentifying restrictions test as
well as tests on autocorrelation in the first and second differences of the residuals
for both the difference and system GMM estimates. The null hypothesis of valid
overidentifying restrictions is not rejected, indicating a well specified model. We
do not find autocorrelation in neither the first nor the second differences. Even
though one would expect to detect autocorrelation in the first differences when
specifying a dynamic panel model, this is not necessary to apply dynamic panel
estimators. Autocorrelation in the second differences would be more problematic
as it would render some instruments invalid. In any case, it is well known that both
the Hansen test as well as the autocorrelation tests suffer from potentially large
losses in power for small sample sizes, see Roodman (2009a). He explicitly states
that for sample sizes as the ones used in our study with only few time periods,
reliance on asymptotic distributions of the test statistics is “worrisome”. As there
exists ample evidence on the persistence of unemployment rates, we nevertheless
are confident that the system GMM estimator for the dynamic panel model is
appropriate.
28 The long-run effects are found by dividing the coefficient by one minus the coefficient on the
lagged dependent variable.
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To sum up, we find no robust statistically significant effect of migration inflows
on unemployment rates. Hence, empirical evidence based on a cross-section of
aggregate migration flows does not support the widely held belief that immigration
is detrimental to employment prospects of workers in the destination country on
average.
4.2 Robustness Checks
In this section we describe two tables with robustness checks. While Table 5
presents regressions using different migration measures than used in Table 4, Table
6 gives results for different trade openness measures, additional control variables
and varying sample definitions.
Migration Measures
In Table 4 we used net inflows of migrants as migration measure where a migrant
was defined as a person which does not have the citizenship of the receiving
country. Column (1) in Table 5 reproduces our preferred specification (8) from
Table 4 for convenience of comparison. By subtracting return migrants from
total immigrants, we assume that it is only the net number of migrants which
influences the unemployment rate. From a theoretical point of view, it is not
entirely clear whether net or total migration flows should be used. If labor markets
are characterized by search frictions, total inflows may be the appropriate measure
especially for quantifying the short-run impact as every new migrant has to search
for a job. However, in the medium- to long-run or when labor markets are very
flexible, net inflows may be more appropriate.
Hence, in column (2) we use total inflow of migrants instead of net inflows.
Now, immigration flows are no longer significant but still negative. Interestingly,
openness now has a negative but still non-significant impact.
So far we used migration flows, implying that we identify our parameters by
exploiting the variation in the change of migration flows over time in the difference
GMM and system GMM specifications. As a robustness check we also investigate
how the stock of migrants affects the unemployment rate, exploiting the variation
in the change of migrant stocks, that is, migration flows. In columns (3) and (4) of
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Table 5: Robustness checks: Different migration measures
Dependent variable: unemployment rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sys-GMM Sys-GMM Sys-GMM Sys-GMM Sys-GMM
Lag dep. var. 0.951*** 0.948*** 1.039*** 1.013*** 0.927***
(0.082) (0.139) (0.108) (0.262) (0.127)
Net inflow (ln) -0.888** 0.083
(0.390) (0.389)
Total inflows (ln) -0.059
(0.654)
Total stock (nationality) (ln) 0.007
(0.008)
Total stock (c. of birth) (ln) 3.085
(1.956)
Total trade openness 0.003 -0.006 0.019** 0.051 0.020
(0.007) (0.012) (0.008) (0.041) (0.017)
Wage distortion (index) -0.011 0.059 0.074 0.067 -0.017
(0.029) (0.161) (0.111) (0.051) (0.048)
EPL (index) 0.948 3.361 1.520 -1.040 1.308
(0.641) (1.936) (1.232) (0.966) (0.752)
Union density (index) -0.003 0.027 0.001 -0.011 0.014
(0.021) (0.033) (0.066) (0.027) (0.039)
High corporatism (index) 0.345 0.315 -0.521 -1.069 -0.210
(0.473) (0.751) (1.238) (1.340) (0.446)
PMR (index) -0.250 -0.364 0.872 1.164 -0.141
(0.299) (0.371) (0.543) (0.855) (0.405)
Population (ln) 1.136** 0.442 0.389 -2.975 0.641
(0.443) (0.501) (1.524) (1.914) (0.726)
Output gap -0.205** -0.358*** -0.126 -0.869* -0.466**
(0.085) (0.128) (0.098) (0.481) (0.226)
Observations 207 207 155 111 207
Countries 24 24 21 18 24
Instruments 27 27 27 27 28
Hansen test (OID) 0.971 0.597 0.996 1.000 0.618
AR(1) 0.587 0.937 0.077 0.753
AR(2) 0.934 0.977 0.009 0.678 0.286
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; all models control for unobserved
country and period effects. H0 for AR(1) and AR(2) is no autocorrelation. Openness, output gap, wage
distortion, and net inflow treated as endogenous in GMM regressions. Maximum number of lags used is
1. Instrument matrix was collapsed as proposed by Roodman (2009b). Constant estimated but not reported.
Total stock (nationality) (ln) is multiplied by 10 for numerical stability.
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Table 5 we therefore replace the migration flows by the stock of foreign citizens and
the stock of foreign-born persons, respectively. It turns out that migrant stocks have
a positive effect on the unemployment rate, but not significantly so. However, in
these regressions the coefficient on the lagged unemployment rate is larger than one
and highly significant, implying an explosive behavior of the unemployment rate.
In addition the test statistic on autocorrelation in the second difference of residuals
implies rejection of no autocorrelation in column (3), hinting at a violation of one
of the system GMM assumptions. This may well be due to the limited availability
of stock data which reduces our sample considerably. Overall, the regressions with
migration flows seem to fit our dynamic specification better as they do not imply a
counter factual explosive behavior for the unemployment rate.
Our employed dynamic GMM estimator does account for the endogeneity of
migration flows by relying on internal instruments based on suitable lags of the
respective variables. However, it is also possible to additionally include external
instruments such as our predicted migration flows. Specification (5) in Table 5
shows the estimates from the specification given in column (1) augmented by the
additional exogenous variable. The results change as now net inflows are no longer
significant and have a positive impact on the unemployment rate.
Trade Openness Measures and Additional Controls
All regressions until now employed a real openness measure as proposed by Alcalá
and Ciccone (2004). It is defined as the sum of imports and exports in exchange
rate US-$ over GDP in purchasing power parity US-$. Traditionally, openness
measures are constructed by dividing by GDP in current US-$. In order to provide
comparable results, we therefore use the latter openness measure in column (1)
in Table 6. Interestingly, we now can corroborate the findings of Felbermayr,
Prat, and Schmerer (2011b) that openness reduces the unemployment rate. Note
though that these authors argue against using these openness measures and use total
trade openness instead as we do in our benchmark regressions. Still, immigration
remains to have a reducing effect on unemployment. Both variables are significant
at the 5% level.
As services are very hard to measure and therefore not very well comparable
across countries, see e.g. Francois and Hoekman (2010), using total trade flows
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including services may render openness a noisy measure for actual trade openness.
Therefore we re-run our preferred specification using an openness measure based
on merchandise trade only. In column (2) we present the Alcalá and Ciccone (2004)
real openness measure using only merchandise trade. While trade openness again
turns out to have a negative influence on unemployment, it is no longer significant.
Immigration has a negative impact on unemployment but is not significant. Im-
migration becomes negatively significant again in column (3), where we use the
standard trade openness based on merchandise trade measured in current US-$
GDP. Here, openness remains negative and not significant.
In columns (4) to (6) in Table 6 we introduce additional control variables
following Dutt, Mitra, and Ranjan (2009). As openness measure, we return to the
total trade openness measure from our preferred specification. We add an index of
civil liberties and an additional measure of trade liberalization. Specifically, we add
the years since permanent trade liberalization of the country as a control. To allow
for a non-linear impact of trade liberalization on unemployment we include the
variable both in levels and squared. The inclusion of the civil liberty index renders
net immigration non-significant. So does the inclusion of the liberalization variable.
Both variables are not significant, though. Openness again turns to have a positive
impact but is again not significant. If we include both variables simultaneously, the
effect of immigration becomes positive again and we estimate an autoregressive
parameter which again implies an explosive behavior of the unemployment rate.
In unreported regressions, we use a different output gap measure. The out-
put gap can also be calculated as the difference between log GDP and log trend
GDP. We calculate GDP by multiplying real GDP per capita (chain) by the pop-
ulation from the Penn World Table, edition 7.0. The trend series is calculated by
Hodrick-Prescott filtering. We use 6.25 as the smoothing factor for annual data as
recommended by Ravn and Uhlig (2002). 29
Furthermore (again not reported), we re-run our preferred specification from
column (8) in Table 4 only for EU receiving countries. The coefficient for net
inflows (ln) is 1.425 with a standard error of 1.328. Splitting the sample in the
years before and after the eastern EU enlargement of 2004 leads to a net inflow
29 Felbermayr, Prat, and Schmerer (2011b) use it for some regressions as well. However, they use
400 as smoothing factor.
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Table 6: Robustness checks: Different control variables
Dependent variable: unemployment rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sys-GMM Sys-GMM Sys-GMM Sys-GMM Sys-GMM Sys-GMM
Lag dep. var. 0.918*** 0.954*** 0.939*** 0.946*** 0.959*** 1.094**
(0.105) (0.081) (0.093) (0.159) (0.145) (0.547)
Net inflow (ln) -0.388* -0.628 -0.429* -1.312 -0.722 0.537
(0.217) (0.384) (0.259) (0.805) (0.681) (7.046)




Merch. curr. price open. -0.013
(0.019)
Total trade openness 0.004 0.009 -0.008
(0.018) (0.019) (0.025)
Wage distortion (index) 0.022 0.016 0.015 0.026 -0.020 -0.013
(0.034) (0.028) (0.024) (0.068) (0.077) (0.239)
EPL (index) 0.249 1.306 0.784 0.105 0.900 3.787
(0.878) (1.243) (0.858) (1.610) (1.620) (15.165)
Union density (index) -0.007 -0.010 -0.005 -0.027 0.015 0.017
(0.015) (0.027) (0.027) (0.033) (0.056) (0.189)
High corporatism (index) -0.330 -0.192 -0.295 0.270 0.194 -1.415
(0.226) (0.391) (0.476) (1.118) (0.707) (5.686)
PMR (index) 0.248 -0.267 0.096 -0.248 0.017 -0.130
(0.384) (0.771) (0.694) (0.508) (0.618) (0.779)
Population (ln) 0.305 0.547 0.424 1.475** 1.275* -0.651
(0.365) (0.504) (0.636) (0.633) (0.758) (6.850)
Output gap -0.275*** -0.276** -0.242 -0.222 -0.235*** -0.992
(0.095) (0.119) (0.169) (0.188) (0.088) (2.951)
Civil liberties -1.420 -0.251
(1.188) (2.803)
Yrs. since lib. -0.090 0.127
(0.172) (0.800)
(Yrs. since lib.)2 0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.007)
Observations 207 207 207 207 207 207
Countries 24 24 24 24 24 24
Instruments 27 27 27 28 29 30
Hansen test (OID) 0.919 0.930 0.944 0.929 0.986 0.970
AR(1) 0.456 0.818 0.576 0.716 0.773 0.814
AR(2) 0.182 0.246 0.154 0.553 0.853 0.818
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; all models control for unobserved country and
period effects. H0 for AR(1) and AR(2) is no autocorrelation. Openness, output gap, wage distortion, and net inflow
treated as endogenous in GMM regressions. Maximum number of lags used is 1. Instrument matrix was collapsed as
proposed by Roodman (2009b). Constant estimated but not reported.
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immigration coefficient of 0.160 (standard error 0.228) and -0.361 (standard error
0.933) for the pre- and post-accession period, respectively. Finally, we augment
our preferred specification by an interaction term between net inflows (ln) and total
trade openness. The value for the interaction term is 0.003 (standard error 0.022),
while the net inflow coefficient is -1.281 (standard error 2.304). Hence, we do not
find a significant interaction between trade openness and immigration.
To again summarize our results, we find no statistically significant impact of
immigration on the unemployment rate across a range of specifications and using
different definitions of the control variables.
5 Conclusions
How do international trade and immigration affect unemployment in the destination
country? While there is ample evidence that trade openness reduces unemployment,
to the best of our knowledge the literature has so far not investigated the effect of
immigration on unemployment explicitly taking into account a country’s exposure
to trade. This is astonishing as it is well known since at least Mundell (1957) that
goods trade implies implicit factor movements. Hence, when one is interested in
the effect of trade on unemployment it seems important to control for additional
movement of workers.
In this paper we present the first evidence of the effects of trade and migrant
inflows on unemployment in the destination country taking into account that
immigration and trade exposure of a country are highly correlated and therefore
not statistically independent. In our sample, we find no significant aggregate effect
of immigrant inflows on unemployment rates in destination countries on average.
This finding seems to be at odds with the widely held belief of a detrimental
effect of immigration on unemployment amongst politicians and the public at large.
More importantly, our findings leave us puzzled about how easy European decision
makers willingly accepted to erect barriers to the freedom of movement: One of the
corner stones of the European Common Market Policy is that workers be employed
on equal, non-discriminatory terms in all member states of the European Union.
Even though restrictions to this right could only be sustained for a seven year
transitional period if the country informed the European Commission about serious
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disruptions on its labor market, two countries (Austria and Germany) actually
achieved shielding their labor markets from inflows for the full seven year period.
Given our results, the feared detrimental effect of immigration on domestic labor
markets seems dubious at best, at least on average. In the worst case it may have
hindered welfare gains for the respective countries due to more efficient allocation
of labor across countries. Taking our results even a step further, on average it may
have even forced additional workers in Austria and Germany into unemployment,
contrary to the well-meant original intention.
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